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Abstract
Recent advances in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) have led to many new promising applica-
tions including habitat monitoring and target track-
ing. However, data communication between nodes
consumes a large portion of the total energy con-
sumption of the WSNs. Consequently, data aggrega-
tion techniques can greatly help to reduce the energy
consumption by eliminating redundant data travel-
ing back to the base station. The security issues
such as data integrity, confidentiality, and freshness
in data aggregation become crucial when the WSN
is deployed in a remote or hostile environment where
sensors are prone to node failures and compromises.
There is currently research potential in securing data
aggregation in the WSN. With this in mind, the se-
curity issues in data aggregation for the WSN will be
discussed in this paper. Then, the adversarial model
that can be used in any aggregation scheme will be
explained. After that, the ”state-of-the-art” proposed
secure data aggregation schemes will be surveyed and
then classified into two categories based on the num-
ber of aggregator nodes and the existence of the verifi-
cation phase. Finally, a conceptual framework will be
proposed to provide new designs with the minimum
security requirements against certain type of adver-
sary. This framework gives a better understanding of
those schemes and facilitates the evaluation process.
Keywords: security, aggregation, wireless sensor net-
works, survey.
1 Introduction
The WSN is defined as highly distributed net-
works of small, lightweight wireless nodes, deployed
in large numbers to mentor the environment or
system by the measurement of physical parameters
such as temperature, pressure, or relative humidity
(Murthy & Manoj 2004, p 647). Sensor nodes are
deployed in large numbers and they collaborate to
form an ad-hoc network capable of reporting to a
data collection sink. Recently, WSN networks have
been used in many promising applications including
habitat monitoring (Mainwaring et al. 2002) and
target tracking (He et al. 2006). However, WSNs
are resource constrained with limited energy life-
time, slow computation, small memory, and limited
communication capabilities. The current version of
sensors such as mica2 (Corporation 2006) uses a 16
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bit, 8MHz Texas Instruments MSP430 microcon-
troller with only 10 KB RAM, 48KB Program space,
1024 KB External flash, and is powered by two
AA batteries. Therefore, the energy impact of the
added security feature should be considered when
implementing a cryptographic technique for securing
data aggregation in the WSN. For example, data
authentication in TinyOS increases the consumed
energy by almost 3% while data authentication and
encryption puts 14% (Guimara˜es et al. 2005). Fur-
thermore, the embedded processors in sensor nodes
are generally not as powerful as those in the nodes
of a wired network. As such, complex cryptographic
algorithms are impractical for WSNs.
Not only the resources limitations affect the
WSN performance but the deployment nature does
also. Most of the WSNs are deployed in remote
or hostile environments and then nodes cannot be
protected from physical attacks since anyone can
access the deployment area. Moreover, the only way
to manage and control the network is via wireless
communication which makes any physical operation
such as battery replacement difficult. Another factor
that affects the WSN performance is communication
instability. For example, if two sensors that have
same aggregator node start sending packets at the
same time, conflicts will occur near the aggregator
node and the transfer process will fail. In addition,
packets might get dropped at highly congested
nodes, since the packet based routing of the WSN is
connectionless, which is inherently unreliable. As a
result, any proposed protocol might also lose critical
security packets such as keys, if it does not maintain
a reasonable channel error rate.
Due to these limitations, devising security
protocols for the WSN is complicated and may not be
successfully accomplished by the simple adaptation
of security solutions designed for wired networks.
Studies such as Wagner (2004) and Krishnamachari
et al. (2002) show that data transmission con-
sumes much more energy than computation. Data
transmission accounts for 70% of the energy cost
of computation and communication for the SNEP
protocol (Perrig et al. 2002). Data aggregation can
greatly help to reduce this consumption by elimi-
nating redundant data. However, the aggregators
are vulnerable to attack especially they are not
equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. When
an aggregator node is compromised, it is easy for
the adversary to change the aggregation result
and inject false data into the WSNs. Unfortu-
nately, the security mechanisms that are used in a
similar network environment are not appropriate
for the WSN since they are based on public key
crytpography which is too expensive for sensor nodes.
Figure 1: An aggregation scenario using sum function.
The only existing survey on secure data aggre-
gation schemes, which is done by Sang et al. (2006),
classifies them into: hop-by-hop and end-to-end en-
crypted data aggregation. However, this classification
does not detail the security analysis of these schemes
nor their performance. They are classified here based
on how many times the data is aggregated when it
travels to the base station.
Our contributions in this paper include the fol-
lowing:
• The security issues in data aggregation for the
WSN are discussed and then secure data aggre-
gation is defined informally.
• An adversarial model is proposed that can be
expected in any secure data aggregation scheme.
This model covers different types of adversaries
where the computational strength, the network
access, and node’s secrets access may vary.
• A survey of the ”state-of-the-art” existing secure
data aggregation schemes is presented and then
classified into two groups according to the num-
ber of aggregator nodes and whether the integrity
of the aggregated result is considered or not.
• Finally a conceptual secure data aggregation
framework is proposed to help in comparing se-
cure data aggregation schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
section 2, data aggregation is explained In section 3,
the expected attacks that threaten secure data ag-
gregation schemes in the WSN is discussed. Then,
different types of attacks are listed. In section 4, the
expected adversary in any secure aggregation scheme
is classified. In section 5, the current research is sur-
veyed and classified into two models. Then in sec-
tion 6, the discussed secure schemes are compared
and then a conceptual framework is given.Finally, sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper.
2 Data Aggregation in the WSN
Typically, there are three types of nodes in
WSN: normal sensor nodes, aggregators, and a
querier. The aggregators collect data from a subset
of the network, aggregate the data using a suitable
aggregation function and then transmit the aggre-
gated result to an upper aggregator or to the querier
who generates the query. The querier is entrusted
with the task of processing the received sensor data
and derives meaningful information reflecting the
events in the target field. It can be the base station
or sometimes an external user who has permission to
interact with the network depending of the network
architecture. Data communication between sensors,
aggregators and the querier consumes a large portion
of the total energy consumption of the WSN. The
WSN in figure 1 contains 16 sensor nodes and uses
SUM function to minimize the energy consumption
by reducing the number of bits reported to the
base station. Node 7, 10-16 are normal nodes that
are collecting data and reporting them back to the
upper nodes whereas nodes 1-6, 8, 9 are aggregators
that perform sensing and aggregating at the same
time. In this example 16 packets traveled within
the network and only one packet is transmitted to
the base station. However, the number of traveling
packets would increase to 50 packets if no data
aggregation exists. This number of packets has been
computed for one query.
Most existing proposals for data aggregation are
subject to attack (Wagner 2004). Once a single node
is compromised, it is easy for an adversary to inject
false data into the network and mislead the aggrega-
tor to accept false readings. Because of this, the need
for secure data aggregation is raised and its impor-
tance needs to be highlighted. However, it was found
that the design principles of secure data aggregation
schemes have no standard and sometimes are poorly
understood. Moreover, there is no clear definition of
what secure data aggregation should mean and what
requirements they should have. These proposals
might have one or more of the security requirements
that are discussed in section 2.1 depending on how
the secure aggregation looks like to the authors.
Unfortunately, following this method to address the
security in data aggregation is not practical and
has several problems. For example, secure data
aggregation has been addressed in (Przydatek et al.
2003) from the point of view of detecting forged data
aggregation values. This does not cover security
issues such as how to elect aggregators or how to set
up trust between aggregators and sensor nodes. Some
proposed protocols provide more security require-
ments than others, or send more bits than others as
seen in section 6. How to compare between them?
Are they all called secure data aggregation protocols?
A general definition for secure data aggregation
is the efficient delivery of the summary of sensor read-
ings that are reported to an off-site user in such a way
that ensures these reported readings have not been
altered (Przydatek et al. 2003). They consider an ag-
gregation application where the querier is located out-
side the WSN and the base station acts as an aggrega-
tor. Moreover, a detailed definition of secure data ag-
gregation is proposed as the process of obtaining a rel-
ative estimate of the sensor readings with the ability
to detect and reject reported data that is significantly
distorted by corrupted nodes or injected by malicious
nodes (Shi & Perrig 2004). However, rejecting re-
ported data that is injected by malicious nodes con-
sumes the network resources, specifically the nodes’
batteries, since each time the suspicious packet will
be processed at the aggregator point. The dam-
age caused by malicious nodes or compromised nodes
should be reduced by adding a self-healing property
to the network. This property helps the network in
learning how to handle new threats through extensive
monitoring of network events, machine learning and
network behavior modeling. Consequently, it is be-
lieved that a secure data aggregation scheme for the
WSN should have the following properties:
• Fair approximation of the sensor readings al-
though a limited number of nodes are compro-
mised.
• Ability to reduce the size of the data transmitted
through the network.
• Data freshness and integrity are important and
should be included in the scheme. However, the
application type of the WSN affects the scheme
designer’s decision regarding whether to add the
data confidentiality and availability or not.
• Dynamic response to attack activities by execut-
ing of a self-healing mechanism.
• Dynamic aggregator election/rotation mecha-
nism to balance the workload at aggregators.
These properties should work together to pro-
vide accurate aggregation results securely without ex-
hausting the network.
2.1 Requirements for Data Aggregation Se-
curity
Since WSNs share some properties with the
traditional wireless networks, the data security
requirements in the WSNs are similar to those in
traditional networks (Perrig et al. 2002, Shi & Perrig
2004). However, there are some unique specifications
that can only be found in WSNs, as discussed
in Section 1, that require more attention during
design process. In this section the required security
properties to strengthen the security in aggregation
schemes will be defined.
• Data Confidentiality: ensures that informa-
tion content is never revealed to anyone who is
not authorized to receive it. It can be divided
(in secure data aggregation schemes) into a hop-
by-hop basis and an end-to-end basis. In the
hop-by-hop basis, any aggregator point needs to
decrypt the received encrypted data, apply some
sort of aggregation function, encrypt the aggre-
gated data, and send it to the upper aggregator
point. This kind of confidentiality implementa-
tion is not practical for the WSN since it requires
extra computation. On the other basis, the ag-
gregator does not need to decrypt and encrypt
data and instead of this, it needs to apply the
aggregation functions directly on the encrypted
data by using homomorphic encryption (West-
hoff et al. 2006). The interested reader in homo-
morphic encryption is referred to Appendix A.
• Data Integrity: ensures that the content of
a message has not been altered, either mali-
ciously or by accident, during transmission pro-
cess. Confidentiality itself is not enough since an
adversary is still able to change the data although
it knows nothing about it. Suppose a secure
data aggregation scheme focuses only on data
confidentiality. An adversary near the aggrega-
tor point will be able to change the aggregated
result sent to the base station by adding some
fragments or manipulating the packet’s content
without detection. Moreover, even without the
existence of an adversary, data might be dam-
aged or lost due to the wireless environment.
• Data Freshness ensures that the data are re-
cent and that no old messages have been replayed
to protect data aggregation schemes against re-
play attacks. In this kind of attack, it is not
enough that these schemes only focus on data
confidentiality and integrity because a passive
adversary is able to listen to even encrypted mes-
sages transmitted between sensor nodes can re-
play them later on and disrupt the data aggrega-
tion results. More importantly when the adver-
sary can replay the distributed shared key and
mislead the sensor about the current key.
• Data Availability ensures that the network is
alive and that data are accessible. It is highly
recommended in the presence of compromised
nodes to achieve network degradation by elim-
inating these bad nodes. Once an attacker gets
into the WSN by compromising a node, the at-
tack will affect the network services and data
availability especially in those parts of the net-
work where the attack has been launched. More-
over, the data aggregation security requirements
should be carefully implemented to avoid extra
energy consumption. If no more energy is left,
the data will no longer be available. When the
adversary is getting stronger, it is necessary that
a secure data aggregation scheme contains some
of the following mechanisms to ensure reasonable
level of data availability in the network:
– Self-healing that can diagnose, and react
to the attacker’s activities especially when
he gets into the network and then start cor-
rective actions based on defined policies to
recover the network or a node.
– Aggregator rotation that rotates the ag-
gregation duties between honest nodes to
balance the energy consumption in WSN.
• Authentication: There are two types of au-
thentication; entity authentication, and data au-
thentication. Entity authentication allows the
receiver to verify if the message is sent by the
claimed sender or not. Therefore, by applying
authentication in the WSNs, an adversary will
not be able to participate and inject data into
the network unless it has valid authentication
keys. On the other hand, data authentication
guarantees that the reported data is the same
as the original one. In a secure data aggrega-
tion, both entity and data authentication are im-
portant since entity authentication ensures that
some exchanged data between sensors. For in-
stance, electing an aggregator point or reporting
invalid aggregated results are authenticated us-
ing their identity while data authentication en-
sures that raw data are received at the aggrega-
tors at the same time as they are being sensed.
• Non-repudiation: ensures that a transfered
packet has been sent and received by the person
claiming to have sent and received the packet.
In secure aggregation schemes, once the aggrega-
tor sends the aggregation results, it should not
be able to deny sending them. This gives the
base station the opportunity to determine what
causes the changes in the aggregation results.
• Data Accuracy: One major outcome of any
aggregation scheme is to provide an aggregated
data as accurately as possible since it is worth
nothing to reduce the number of bits in the aggre-
gated data but with very low data accuracy. A
trade-off between data accuracy and aggregated
data size should be considered at the design stage
because higher accuracy requires sending more
bits and thus needs more power.
3 Types of Attacks on WSN Aggregation
WSNs are vulnerable to different types of attacks
(Roosta et al. 2006) due to the nature of the trans-
mission medium (broadcast), remote and hostile de-
ployment location, and the lack of physical security in
each node. However, the damage caused by these at-
tacks varies from scheme to scheme according to the
assumed adversarial model (to be discussed in sec-
tion 4) which is assumed by the scheme’s designers.
In this section, these attacks that might affect the
aggregation in the WSN are discussed.
• Denial of Service Attack(DoS): is a standard
attack on the WSN by transmitting radio signals
that interfere with the radio frequencies used by
the WSN and is sometimes called jamming. As
the adversary capability increases, it can affect
larger portions of the network. In the aggrega-
tion context, an example of the DoS can be an
aggregator that refuses to aggregate and prevents
data from traveling into the higher levels.
• Node Compromise: is where the adversary is
able to reach any deployed sensor and extract
the information stored on it which is some times
called supervision attack. Considering the data
aggregation scenario, once a node has been taken
over, all the secret information stored on it can
be extracted.
• Sybil Attack: is where the attacker is able to
present more than one identity within the net-
work. It affects aggregation schemes in different
ways. Firstly, an adversary may create multi-
ple identities to generate additional votes in the
aggregator election phase and select a malicious
node to be the aggregator. Secondly, the aggre-
gated result may be affected if the adversary is
able to generate multiple entries with different
readings. Thirdly, some schemes use witnesses
to validate the aggregated data and the data is
only valid if n out of m witnesses agreed on the
aggregation results. However, an adversary can
launch a Sybil attack and generate n or more
witness identities to make the base station ac-
cept the aggregation results.
• Selective Forwarding Attack: With no con-
sideration about security, it is assumed in the
WSN that each node will accurately forward re-
ceived messages. However, a compromised node
may refuse to do so. It is up to the adversary
that is controlling the compromised node to ei-
ther forward the received messages or not. In
the aggregation context, any compromised inter-
mediate nodes have the ability to launch the se-
lective forwarding attack and this subsequently
affects the aggregation results.
• Replay Attack: In this case an attacker records
some traffic from the network without even un-
derstanding its content and replays them later on
to mislead the aggregator and consequently the
aggregation results will be affected.
• Stealthy Attack: The adversary aims to inject
false data into the network without revealing its
existence. In a data aggregation scenario, the in-
jected false data value leads to a false aggregation
result. A compromised node can report signifi-
cantly biased or fictitious values, and perform a
Sybil attack to affect the aggregation result.
4 Adversarial Model
In this section, we describe the different capabil-
ities that an adversary may have against the WSN.
4.1 Adversary Type
Secure data aggregation schemes are threaten by
two types of adversaries: passive and active. Pas-
sive adversary affects the data confidentiality prop-
erty while active adversary affects data integrity prop-
erty.
• Passive Adversary: is the adversary that takes
advantage from the communication nature of
the wireless (broadcasting) and eavesdrop on
the traffic to obtain any important information
about the sensed data. For example, if the ad-
versary is able to hear the traffic near the aggre-
gator point, it can gain some knowledge about
the aggregated result especially if the secure data
aggregation scheme does not ensure data confi-
dentiality.
• Active Adversary: is the adversary that inter-
acts with the WSN by injecting packets, destroy-
ing nodes, stopping/delaying packets from being
delivered to the querier, compromising nodes and
extracting sensitive data, etc.
4.2 Network Access
Each WSN has three different types of compo-
nents: sensor, aggregator, and base station with dif-
ferent functionalities and capabilities. In this section,
the adversary ability to compromise these three ele-
ments is discussed.
• Total Access: The adversary that has total ac-
cess to the network is powerful and has access to
the whole WSN. If the adversary is passive, this
means that he can listen to all communications
between nodes. On the other hand, if the ad-
versary is active, this means that he can interact
with all types of components in the WSN.
• Partial Access: The adversary in this type has
less power compared to the previous one. Its
goal is to listen to communications between a
subset of nodes in the network, if the adversary
is passive. On the other hand, if the adversary is
active, this means that he can only interact with
a subset of nodes in the WSN.
Table 1: Adversarial Models in the Aggregation schemes
Adv. Type Network Access Secrets Access Adv. Classification
Active Passive Total Partial Total No Strong Med Light
CDA x x x x
SDA x x x x
SIA x x x x
SHDA x x x x
RA x x x x
WDA x x x x
SecureDAV x x x x
SRDA x x x x
SDAP x x x x
ESA x x x x
EDA x x x x
4.3 Access to Secret Data
This refers to the sensitive information kept in
the nodes. Based on the assumptions made by the
designers, each scheme considers an adversary with
different access levels to the secrets that are kept on
the sensors.
• Total Access: The adversary that has total ac-
cess to the node’s secrets is able to extract all the
sensitive information that is stored in the sensor’s
memory and then harm the aggregation results.
• Partial Access: The adversary with this type
of access is able to only extract some of the secret
data that is stored in the sensor’s memory.
4.4 Adversary Classification
Table 1 summaries the adversary types that are
exist in different secure aggregation proposals based
on the designers’ assumptions. It is concluded that
the existing adversaries can be divided into three
types:
• Strong Adversary: refers to an active adver-
sary that has the ability to compromise any com-
ponent in the WSN. In other words, it can be de-
scribed as an active adversary with no limitation
on its network access and its ability to extract
secret data on sensor’s memory since the aggre-
gated data are highly important to the adversary.
• Medium Adversary: refers to an active ad-
versary that has low computational strength to
launch an attack against the secure system be-
cause the aggregated data are not that impor-
tant as in the previous type and also because the
network access is limited.
• Light Adversary: refers to a passive adversary
with limited access to the network and it is inter-
ested to reveal the encrypted aggregated data.
It is believed that this adversary classification
should help in the better evaluation of the proposed
schemes and facilitate making decisions on which
scheme is more suitable for specific conditions (as de-
scribed in section 6).
5 Classification of Existing Secure Data Ag-
gregation Schemes
This section classifies the proposed secure data
aggregation schemes into two models: the one ag-
gregator model and the multiple aggregator model.
Under each model, each scheme is examined to see
whether it has a verification phase or not.
Figure 2: Sketch of single and multi aggregator
model.
5.1 Single Aggregator Model
In this model, the aggregation process takes place
once between the sensing nodes and the base station
or the external user. In other words, all individual
collected data in the WSN travels to only one aggre-
gator point in the network before reaching the querier.
This aggregator node should be powerful enough to
perform the expected high computation and commu-
nication. The main role of the data aggregation might
not be satisfied fully since redundant data will still
travel in the network for a while until they reach the
aggregator as in Figure 2-a. This model is useful when
the network is small or when the querier is not in the
same network. However, large networks are not suit-
able places to implement this model especially when
data redundancy at the lower levels is high. The data
aggregation schemes that fit in this model can be di-
vided into two categories: whether they have a veri-
fication phase or not.
• Verification Phase: informs on the secure data
aggregation schemes that aggregate data once in
its way to the querier. This phase enhances the
querier’s ability to distinguish between the valid
and invalid aggregated readings.
• No Verification Phase: informs on the secure
data aggregation scheme that does not contain a
verification phase because data integrity has not
been considered by the scheme’s designers. In
other words, the type of expecting adversary is
honest but has some interest in knowing about
sensitive information while the one in the pre-
vious phase is not honest and can inject false
readings.
5.2 Multiple Aggregator Model
In this model, collected data in the WSN are ag-
gregated more than one time before reaching the last
destination (querier). This model achieves greater re-
duction in the number of bits transmitted within the
network especially in the large WSNs, as illustrated
in Figure 1. A sketch of the multi-aggregator model
can be found in Figure 2-b. The importance of this
model appears as the network size is getting bigger
especially when data redundancy at the lower levels
is high. The data aggregation schemes that fit in this
model can be divided into two categories: whether
they have a verification phase or not.
• Verification Phase: Secure data aggregation
scheme that contains a verification phase to en-
hance the querier ability in distinguishing be-
tween the valid and invalid aggregated readings.
This phase is more complicated than the same
phase in the single aggregator model since the
data is aggregated many times at different aggre-
gation points. The querier is interested to know
whether the final aggregated result is altered or
not by one of these points.
• No Verification Phase: informs on the secure
data aggregation scheme that does not contain a
verification phase because data integrity has not
been considered by the scheme’s designers.
6 Comparison of the secure aggregation
schemes
This section, attempts to compare the secure
data aggregation schemes that were reviewed in sec-
tion 5. Comparisons of security schemes can be diffi-
cult since the designers solve secure aggregation from
different angles. Therefore, these schemes are com-
pared in a number of different ways: security services
provided, cryptographic primitives used, resilience
against attacks described in section 3, and the num-
ber of bits transmitted in the aggregation phase. For
each method an attempt is made to show the differ-
ences between these secure aggregation schemes.
6.1 Description of Existing Schemes
The first secure data aggregation (SDA) was
proposed by Hu & Evans (2003) who studied the
problem of data aggregation once one node is com-
promised. This protocol achieves resilience against
a node compromise by delaying the aggregation and
authentication at the upper levels. Therefore, sensors
measurements are forwarded unchanged and then
aggregated at the second hop instead of aggregating
them at the immediate next hop. Thus, the sensor
needs to buffer the data to authenticate it once the
shared key is revealed by the base station. Moreover,
the proposed scheme only offers data integrity, fresh-
ness and authentication. Even though it increases
the confidence in the sensor readings integrity the
data can be altered once a parent and child in the hi-
erarchy are compromised. Once a compromised node
is detected, no practical action is taken to reduce the
damage caused by this compromise which affects the
data availability in the network. Much worse, once
a grandfather node detects a node compromise, it
could not decide whether the cheating node is the
child or the grandchild.
Figure 3: Classification of Existing Secure Data Ag-
gregation Schemes.
In addition, SDA scheme is improved in ESA by
Jadia & Mathuria (2004). Instead of using µTESLA
to authenticate the base station’s broadcast in the
validation process to reveal the shared key with
sensors, the authors used one-hop pairwise keys (to
encrypt data between a node and its parent) and
two-hop pairwise keys (to encrypt data between a
node and its grandparent). This will improve the
secure aggregation scheme by adding data confiden-
tiality and reducing the memory overhead since data
does not need to be stored until the key is revealed.
However, the system will still break as soon as two
consecutive nodes in the hierarchy are compromised.
Przydatek et al. (2003) proposed a secure
information aggregation (SIA) framework for WSNs
called aggregate-commit-prove. This framework
provides resistance against a special type of attack
called stealthy attacks aggregate manipulation where
the attacker’s goal is to make the user accept false
aggregation results without revealing its presence
to the user. It consists of three node categories: a
home server, a base station, and sensor nodes. SIA
assumes that each sensor has a unique identifier
and shares a separate secret cryptographic key with
both the home server and the aggregator. The keys
enable message authentication and encryption if data
confidentiality is required. Moreover, it assumes
that the home server and base station can use a
mechanism, such as µTESLA (Perrig et al. 2002),
to broadcast authentic messages. SIA consists of
three parts: collecting data from sensors and locally
computing the aggregation result, committing to the
collected data, and reporting the aggregation result
while proving the correctness of the result. SIA offers
data integrity, authentication, data freshness, and
confidentiality (if required).
Wagner (2004) proposed a mathematical frame-
work (RA) for evaluating the security of several
resilient aggregation techniques. The paper mea-
sures how much damage an adversary can cause by
compromising a number of nodes and then using
them to inject erroneous data. Wagner described
a number of better methods for securing the data
aggregation such as how the median function is
a good way to summaries statistics. Furthermore,
Wagner claimed that trimming and truncation can be
used to strengthen the security of many aggregation
primitives by eliminating possible outliers. However,
this work only focused on examining the received
aggregated data (at the base station) without
Table 2: Attacks Against Existing Aggregation Schemes.
Scheme Denial of Node Sybil Selective Replay Stealthy Adversary
services compromise forwarding Classification
CDA x x light
SDA x x x x med
SIA x x x high
SHDA x x x high
WDA x x x x x x med
SecureDAV x x x x x med
SRDA x light
SDAP x x x x med
ESA x x x x med
EDA x light
studying how these data are aggregated. Thus,
when the network size increases, the communication
cost will be very high for the transmission of all
the sensor readings to the base station. Moreover,
eliminating abnormal data with no further reasoning
is impractical especially for applications such as
monitoring bush-fire.
A witness based data aggregation (WDA)
scheme for the WSN is being proposed by Du et al.
(2003) to assure the validation of the data sent from
an aggregator node to the base station. In order
to prove the validity of the aggregated result, the
aggregator node has to provide proofs from several
witnesses. A witness is one who also performs data
aggregation like the aggregator node, but does not
forward its result to the base station. Instead, each
witness computes the message authentication code
(MAC) of the result and then sends it to the aggrega-
tor node which must forward the proofs to the base
station. WDA offers only integrity property to the
data aggregation security and this is required to send
multiple copies similar to the original aggregated
result, to the aggregator point. Thus, the aggregator
point must forward these reports as well as the
aggregated result to the base station. Since the
aggregator point is fixed and responsible to handle
so much traffic, the aggregator resources will not last
long.
Moreover, SecureDAV (Mahimkar & Rappaport
2004) improved the data integrity vulnerability in
SDA and ESA by signing the aggregated data. In
SecureDAV, each sensor within a cluster will have its
share of its secret cluster key and then it will be able
to generate a partial signature on the aggregated
data. Once an aggregator receives sensor readings in
the same cluster, it aggregates them and broadcasts
the average value of the readings. Each sensor in the
cluster compares its reading with the average value
received from the aggregator. Then, it partially signs
the average value only and only if the difference
between the received average value and its reading
is less than a certain value (threshold). Then, the
aggregator (cluster-head) combines partial signatures
to form a full signature of the aggregated results and
sends it to the base station. SecureDAV provides
data confidentiality, data integrity, and authentica-
tion. The drawbacks of this scheme are: it requires
high communication costs on data validation, and
supports only the AVG aggregation function.
Yang et al. (2006) proposed a secure hop-by-
hop data aggregation protocol (SDAP) that can
tolerate more than one compromised node. SDAP
is based on two principles: divide-and-conquer and
commit-and-attest. In order to reduce the damage
caused by compromising an aggregator at a high
level in the per-hop aggregation scheme, SDAP
uses the divide-and-conquer principle to divide the
network tree into multiple logical subtrees which
increases the number of aggregators and reduces the
number of nodes in each subtree. Consequently, the
damage caused by compromising an aggregator of
a subtree is reduced. The other principle, that is
commit-and-attest, enhances the ordinary hop-by-
hop aggregation scheme by adding a commitment
property, and helps the base station to prove the cor-
rectness of the aggregated data. Once an aggregator
of a logical subtree commits its aggregation result, it
can not deny it later on. This scheme needs to send
much data to ensure reasonable level of security (as
explained in Appendix B).
Furthermore, Chan et al. (2006) extended the
work in SIA by applying the aggregate-commit-prove
framework in fully a distributed network instead of
single aggregator model. In general, this scheme
(SHDA) offers exactly what the SIA does data
integrity, authentication, and confidentiality. Each
parent sensor performs an aggregation function
whenever it has heard from its child nodes. In
addition, it has to create a commitment to the set
of the input used to compute the aggregated result
by using a merkle hash tree. Then, it forwards the
aggregated data and the commitment to its parent
until it reaches the base station. Once the base
station received the final commitment values, it
rebroadcasts them into the rest of the network in an
authenticated broadcast. Each node is responsible
for checking whether its contribution was added to
the aggregated data or not. Once its readings are
added, it sends an authentication code to the base
station where the authentication code for node R is
MACKR(N‖OK). For communication efficiency, the
authentication codes are aggregated along the way
to the base station. However, missing one authenti-
cation code for any reason leads the base station to
reject the aggregated result. Furthermore, noticeable
delay, too much transmission and computation will
be added as consequences of adding security to the
scheme.
Sanli et al. (2004) developed a new data aggre-
Table 3: Comparison between different secure data aggregation schemes
Scheme Confidentiality Integrity Freshness Availability Authentication
CDA x
SDA x x x
SIA x x x x
SHDA x x x
WDA x x
SecureDAV x x x
SRDA x x
SDAP x x x x
ESA x x x x
EDA x
gation technique called the Secure Reference-Based
Data Aggregation scheme (SRDA) that sends only
the difference between sensed data and the reference
value (called differential value) instead of raw data.
Deference value is taken as the average value of
previous sensor readings. In SRDA scheme, each
sensor computes the differential data (sensed data -
reference value), encrypts it, and then sends it to the
cluster-head. The authors claim that the security
level of the network should be gradually increased
as the data is traveled to higher level cluster-heads.
Therefore, they suggest using a cryptographic al-
gorithm (RC6) with adjustable parameters such as
the number of rounds, to achieve different level of
security in the WSN. Increasing or decreasing the
number of rounds changes the security strength
of the RC6 that can be measured by the security
margin. The security margin is the deviation of the
actual number of rounds from the minimum number
of rounds for which the algorithm is considered to be
secured. The SRDA uses a higher security margin
at higher level cluster-heads compared to low level
cluster-heads.
Moreover, the problem of aggregating encrypted
data in the WSN is being addressed in (Westhoff
et al. 2006). The proposed protocol, called Con-
cealed Data Aggregation (CDA), uses an additive
and multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme
that allows the aggregator to aggregate encrypted
data. In this paper, the authors argued that the
security level is still reasonable and the privacy ho-
momorphism (PH) (Domingo-Ferrer 2002) helps to
implement encryption in the WSN, although Wagner
(2003) proved that PH is unsecure against chosen
plain text attacks. However, they admitted that
the encryption in CDA is very expensive and adds
between 0%-22% additional data overhead compared
to RC5 which increases the power consumption of
the sending node. Genrally speaking, CDA ensures
only data confidentiality.
Furthermore, a new secure data aggregation
scheme based on homomorphic encryption (EDA) is
proposed by (Castelluccia et al. 2005) This allows an
aggregator to execute the aggregation function and
aggregate the encrypted data that are received from
its children with no need for decryption and to re-
cover the original messages. It uses a modular addi-
tion instead of the xor (Exclusive-OR) operation that
is found in the stream ciphers. Thus, even if an ag-
gregator is being compromised, original messages can
not be revealed by an attacker. The authors claimed
that the provided privacy protection by this scheme
is comparable to the privacy protection that is pro-
vided by a scheme that performs end-to-end encryp-
tion with no aggregation. However, they admit that
their proposed scheme generates significant overhead
if the network is unreliable since sensors’ identities of
non-responding nodes must be sent together with the
aggregated result to the base station. More impor-
tantly, this scheme concerns only one security prop-
erty which is data confidentiality.
6.2 Security Services Provided
Since the considered type of adversary varies
from one scheme to another, each proposed scheme
has different requirements. Data authentication is a
must in each secure scheme that defeats against any
type of active adversary. Table 3 shows that data
confidentiality is the minimum security requirement
that should be provided when a light type of adver-
sary is considered. Once the adversary capability
increases and reaches the medium type, some of the
proposed schemes protect against it by providing data
integrity and authentication. However, the medium
adversary type is able to at least launch the replay
attack. It is believed that the minimum security
requirements that provide reasonable security levels
against this type of adversary should include data
freshness too. As the adversary is getting stronger,
a combination of data confidentiality, data integrity,
authentication, and data freshness should exist in
the proposed scheme. If the network lifetime is a
concern for the designers, then the data availability
should be provided as well. However, none of the
existing proposals consider the data availability even
when a strong adversary exists.
As a conclusion, the CDA, EDA, and SRDA have
met the minimum security requirements when a light
type of adversary is around. When the medium type
is considered, the SDA, ESA, and SDAP have met
the minimum requirements. However, the WDA and
SecureDAV have not met the minimum requirements
because they did not offer data freshness. Finally,
the minimum requirements have been met in the SIA
and SHDA when an adversary with strong capability
is considered.
6.3 Cryptographic Primitives Used
The cryptographic primitives used in each of the
proposed schemes are varied according to how the au-
thors employ different primitives to achieve a certain
Table 4: Cryptographic primitives used
Scheme Message Digital Symmetric Public Readings Privacy Broadcast Inter- Voting
authen- signa- key key commit- homom- authen-. active sche-
tication ture ment orphic tication protocol em
CDA x x
SDA x x x
SIA x x x x x
SHDA x x x x x
RA
WDA x x x
SecureDAV x x x
SRDA x
SDAP x x x x x
ESA x x
EDA x x
service. Table 4 shows that most of these schemes
use a message authentication code (MAC) to exclude
unauthorized parties from sending forged aggregated
data. However, SecureDAV uses a digital signature
instead. Furthermore, the MAC is used to protect the
original message from being altered. Symmetric and
public keys have been used to achieve hop-by-hop or
end-to-end encryptions which prevent the passive ad-
versary from eavesdropping on the traffic. Moreover,
a verification process in these schemes has been set
up in different ways, such as: using interactive proto-
cols, broadcast authentication by the base station, or
voting system.
6.4 Attacks Existence
This section analyses the secure aggregation
schemes described in Section 5 and investigates
whether they are vulnerable to types of attacks de-
scribed in section 3 or not. Table 2 shows that all
these schemes are vulnerable to DoS and Physical at-
tacks as long as the existence of at least the light type
of adversary. As the capability of the adversary varies
from light to strong, the damage caused by these at-
tacks varies, too. The stronger adversary can jam
a wider range of the network, while the light adver-
sary can jam only a limited area. Moreover, since the
light type of adversary is not interested in affecting
the data integrity of the system, the adversary will
not be interested in launching Sybil, Replay, Selec-
tive forwarding, stealthy, and Spoofed-altered attacks
such as in CDA. Replay attack may be launched in
these schemes by the medium type of adversary or
above, unless these schemes provide data freshness
(Table 3). For example, the WDA and SecureDAV
schemes are vulnerable to replay attack. This type of
adversary, can also launch Sybil attack in secure ag-
gregation schemes unless the identity is checked upon
receiving any message.
6.5 Framework for Evaluation New Schemes
Based on the analyses in the previous sections,
a conceptual framework, helps the new schemes de-
signers to strengthen their proposed scheme against
the considered adversarial model. As far as is known
this work is the first that tries to build such a frame-
work that can suggest the minimum security require-
ments that should exist in any scheme according to
its specifications. It is believed that the security level
can be determined by considering one of the adver-
sarial models (discussed in section 4). Then, the net-
work size helps the designers to choose the proper
aggregation model. Figure 4 shows that the mini-
mum requirements for a proposed secure scheme to
resist against the light adversary are data confiden-
tiality and freshness. It is suggested that these re-
quirements be offered in the single aggregator model
if the network size is small, otherwise, in the multi-
ple aggregator model. The minimum security services
that are required to resist against the medium adver-
sary are data integrity, authentication, and freshness,
while the required services to resist against the strong
adversary needs data confidentiality as well as.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
By reviewing the existing data aggregation se-
curity in the WSN, an adversarial model that can
threaten any secure aggregation scheme has been pro-
posed. Consequently, these schemes were classified
into two groups: the one aggregator model, and the
multiple aggregator model. Based on this classifica-
tion and the adversarial model, a conceptual frame-
work that leads to better evaluation of secure aggre-
gation schemes was also proposed. In the future, it is
planned to evaluate more secure schemes and extend
the framework if necessary.
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Appendix A: Homomorphic Cryptosystems
During the last few years homomorphic en-
cryption schemes have been studied extensively since
they are proved to be useful in many cryptographic
protocols such as electronic elections (Grigoriev
& Ponomarenko 2003), sensor networks (Westhoff
et al. 2006, Castelluccia et al. 2005) and so on.
Homomorphic cryptosystem is a cryptosystem that
allows direct computation on encrypted data by
using an efficient scheme. It is an important tool
that can be used in a secure aggregation scheme to
provide end to end privacy if needed. The scheme is
called additively homomorphic if the message space
(M) is an additive while it is called multiplicative
homomorphic if M is a multiplicative. Moreover, the
encryption algorithm (E) is called probabilistic if it
gets a uniform random number as an input otherwise
it is called deterministic.
The classical RSA scheme (Rivest et al. 1978)
is a good example of a deterministic, multiplicative
homomorphic cryptosystem on M = /N where
N is the product of two large primes. Thus, C =
/N is the ciphertext space while the key space is
K = {(ke, kd) = ((N, e), d) | N = pq,
ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N)}
The encryption of any message m ∈ M is defined
as:
Eke(m) = m
e mod N
while the decryption of any ciphertext c ∈ C is defined
as:
Dke,kd(c) = c
d mod N = m mod N
Obviously, the encryption of the product of two
messages m1,m2 ∈M can be computed by multiply-
ing the corresponding ciphertexts:
Eke(m1 · m2) = (m1 m2)
e mod N
= (me1 mod N) (m
e
2 mod N)
= Eke (m1) · Eke(m2)
Appendix B: Performance Analysis
A Notations
For simplicity to perform our calculations in the
following sections, we only consider the case which
the leaf nodes transmit their readings and no read-
ings are expected from aggregator nodes. We assume
a general tree hierarchy in which every node has b
children and the depth of the tree is d as in figure 5.
This means the distance between the base station and
the leaf nodes are d. Therefore, this kind of tree has
bd leaf nodes. In single aggregator model we consider
the root of the tree to be the aggregator. Let us de-
note the length in bits of reported message from the
leaf nodes toward upper level as x where x can be
raw data or encrypted data. The sensor node ID in
bits will be denoted as y. Also, we denote the MAC’s
length in bits as z. Also, let us denote query nonce
as qn. Since TinyOS packet is pre-configured with a
maximum size of 36 byte, 29 byte payload and 6 byte
header, we denote header as oh to compute the over-
head bits transmitted within the network. Finally,
the total number of nodes N in this type of tree is n
bits long and can be computed as
(
bd+1 − 1
b− 1
)
(1)
1
1 2b2 b
Aggregator point
Base Station
1 b2
.........
d
.........
.........
Figure 5: Tree model used to analyze the performance
of schemes.
B Number of transmitted bits
First, we start analyzing the number of trans-
mitted bits by considering the situation where no ag-
gregation and no security are used. In this case each
sensor forwards data as soon as it receives it. Sup-
pose each node at level d sends its ID and sensed data
toward its parents which are x+ y+ oh bits long. So,
the total number of bits generated at level d will be
bd(x+y+oh). Since each intermediate node needs to
forward b(x+y) bits which adds oh bits as header into
each transmission , the total number of bits traveled
within the network is approximately
(d+ 1)bd(x+ y + oh) (2)
Next, SDA as being discussed in section 5.2
achieves resilient against a node compromise by delay-
ing the aggregation and authentication at the upper
levels. So, each leaf node (at depth d) needs to send
its ID, data, and one message authentication code to-
ward its parent. The length of this message in bits
will be x+ y+ z+ oh. Therefore, the total number of
bits sent by all the leaf nodes is bd(x+y+z+oh). Also,
each node at depth d-1 needs to forward the received
data unchanged and add one MAC. Thus, the length
of this message in bits will be b(x+y+z)+z+oh and
the total number of bits sent by all the nodes at level
d-1 should be bd−1[b(x + y + z) + z + oh]. We com-
pute the length of transmitted message at level d-2,
d-3, and so on till we reach the base station. The ap-
proximate number of transmitted bits in this scheme
is
bd(x+y+z+oh)+
(
bd − b
b− 1
+ 1
)
[b(x+y+z)+z+oh]
(3)
However, the improvement in ESA that adds con-
fidentiality requires each node to add one more mes-
sage authentication into the message. So, instead of
sending x + y + z + oh bits in SDA at each node at
depth d, x+ y+2z+ oh bits are needed to be sent by
ESA. The total number of bits sent by all leaf nodes is
bd(x+y+2z+oh) and consequently the total number
of bits sent by ESA will be approximately
bd(x+y+2z+oh)+
(
bd − b
b− 1
+ 1
)
[b(x+y+z)+z+oh]
(4)
Table 5: Number of bytes transmitted within WSN
b=2 b=3 b=4
d=2 d=3 d=4 d=2 d=3 d=4 d=2 d=3 d=4
No Aggregation 180 480 1200 405 1620 6075 720 3840 19200
SDA 210 462 966 399 1155 3423 546 2226 8946
ESA 234 510 1062 471 1470 4467 792 2520 13032
SDAP 289 623 1334 636 1722 6374 1119 4704 19709
CDA 91 248 512 215 660 1997 347 1403 5627
SIA 261 709 1829 541 2305 9109 933 5413 28709
WDA 825 2265 5865 1725 7395 29265 2985 17385 92265
In SDAP, it uses divide-and-conquer principle
to divide the network tree into multiple logical sub-
trees which increases the number of aggregators and
reduces the number of nodes in each subtree. For sim-
plicity, we assume each subtree has an average size of
s and therefore the number of subtrees is (N/s) + 1
considering the base station as a subtree. Also, the
hight of a subtree can be approximated by d/2 and
the distance from each subtree’s leader and the base
station is d/2. Each leaf node needs to send its ID,
aggregation flag (one bit), an encrypted sensed data
that is concatenated with a MAC. This transmission
is about x + y + z + 1 + oh bits long. Thus, the to-
tal number of bits transmitted by all nodes at level
d is bd(x + y + z + 1 + oh) and consequently the
number of bits reaches the subtree’s leader is around
(s−1)bd(x+y+z+1+oh). Next, each subtree’s leader
will forward the aggregation result toward the base
station and this increases the number of traveled bits
within the network by (N/s)(d/2)(x+ y+ z+1+ oh)
bits. Therefore, the total number of bits is approxi-
mated by
bd(s−1)(x+y+z+1+oh)+
(
N
s
d
2
)
(x+y+z+1+oh)
(x+ y + z + 1 + oh)[bd(s− 1) +
(
Nd
2s
)
] (5)
Moreover, the authors of CDA admitted that the
encryption in CDA is very expensive and adds be-
tween 0%-22% additional data overhead compared to
RC5 which increase the power consumption of the
sending node. For example, the size of encrypted one
Byte sensed data will increase to 9 Bytes by using
RC5 while the size will range between 9 - 11 Bytes by
using PH encryption (Westhoff et al. 2006). In other
words, we can assume that the ecypted data has cx
bits where c is constant that represent the overhead
caused by encrypting 1 bit using PH. This means, the
total encrypted messages in bits is approximatetly
N(cx+ oh) (6)
It obvious that the number of bits is increased
linearly with the plain-text size (raw sensed data at
the leaf nodes) and the number of leaf nodes. Conse-
quently, the power consumption will increase linearly.
Subsequently, SIA proposed a secure information
aggregation framework for WSNs called aggregate-
commit-prove. In the aggregate phase, each leaf sen-
sor needs to send its ID, data, query nonce, and
two message authentication codes with two shared
keys between the sensor and the aggregator and the
base station. The length of this message in bits is
x + y + qn + 2z + oh. This message travels all the
way toward the aggregator that is d hops away in our
example. Therefore, the total number of bits trav-
eled within the network till the sensed data reaches
the aggregator is dbd(x + y + qn + 2z + oh) in each
event. Then in the commit phase, the aggregator con-
structs a merkle hash tree of the received messages
and sends the root of this tree as a commitment value,
the number of leaves of the hash tree (the number of
leaf nodes), and aggregated result. Let us assume
for simplicity the length of the commitment value is
(x+ y + qn+ 2z) bits long and the length of the ag-
gregated result as long as the reported data x. Thus,
the total number of bits sent to the remote user by
the aggregator is n+2x+y+ qn+2z+oh. Thus, the
total number of traveled bits within the network will
be
dbd(x+y+qn+2z+oh)+n+2x+y+qn+2z+oh (7)
In WDA, authors assume that leave nodes are
honest and the sensed data reaches the aggregator
and wetnesses correctly. Let us assume that each sen-
sor needs to send at least its ID and sensed data. The
length of this message in bits is x+y+oh. Therefore,
dbd(x+ y + oh) bits needs to be traveled withing the
network to reach the aggregator for each event. Also,
the same number of bits goes to each witness (w)
and consequently the total number of traveled bits
is wdbd(x + y + oh). Each witness computes the ag-
gregated data and send message authentication code
(MAC) contains its ID, aggregation result, and its
shared key with the base station and sends its MAC
to the aggregator. Finally, the aggregator forwards
its ID, aggregation result computed by him, and all
MACs received from the witnesses. Therefore, the
total number of traveled bits is
dbd(x+y+oh)+wdbd(x+y+oh)+w(z+oh)+(x+y+wz+oh)
dbd(x+y+oh)(1+w)+2wz+x+y+oh(w+1) (8)
C Example
In this section, we give an example with numbers
to give a better understanding about the previous
equations in section B. Let us select x, y, z, w to
be 7 bytes, 2 bytes, 6 bytes, 5 witnesses respectively.
We compute the number of bytes that each secure
aggregation scheme transmits to achieve the aggre-
gation result with no consideration about the extra
overhead comes from the verification process (if
exist) since not all of the schemes cover this process.
In Tabel 5, we investigate some of proposed
secure data aggregation schemes in the context of the
number of transmitted bits during the aggregation
phase. We started with a system that has no aggre-
gation to be as a reference in our comparison. CDA
needs to send less number of bits compared to the
system with no aggregation because it assumes light
adversary type and performs multiple aggregation be-
fore sending the readings into the base station. As-
suming light adversary means less security services
provided which leads to less number of bits must be
sent. Also, performing multiple aggregation helps the
scheme to minimize the transmitted bits by removing
redundant data and also removing the extra bits such
as headers. As the adversary capability increases, the
number of bits increases as well to provide reasonable
level of security. For example, when the designers
consider medium type of adversary, the security ser-
vices provided should be different to those in the light
type. From Tabel 5, SDA, ESA, SDAP, and WDA
consider medium adversary type and send more bits
than schemes that assumed to defeat against light
adversary such as CDA. The reason that WDA sends
more bits than other schemes, that defeat against the
same type of adversary, is because it belongs to the
one aggregator model. Finally, SIA considers high
adversary type and can achieve its security goals by
transmitting number of bits within the results of other
secure proposals that defeat against medium type of
adversary.
